In his work the Clash of Civilizations S.P. Huntington classifi ed Ukraine as a "cleft country." In our view, the current discord in Ukraine is rooted in the political divisions that have frequently characterised the post-communist countries. In Ukraine, owing to a history of divergent socio-economic development in the various regions, these divisions are strongly regional. The dichotomic socio-economic framework refl ects not only ethnic and religious diff erences but also such factors as urbanisation, economic development, and even natural elements. The resulting political divide in Ukraine may be traced to the dichotomy of its national identity. The dividing line is between east and west, urban and rural, and Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine. Politically, it is between "Maidan-Ukraine" and "Anti-Maidan-Ukraine". The divide runs along the Uman'-Kharkiv line between the forest zone and the steppe. In the 18 th century the steppe -which had once been a corridor for the nomadic peoples -became a frontier territory for the Ukrainians and then for Tsarist Russia. The Russian ties of cities in the region were further strengthened by industrialisation in the 19 th and 20 th centuries and by Russifi cation in the Soviet era. The Soviet-made famine (Holodomor) and the events of World War II (the actions of the UPA) heightened Ukraine's political dichotomy. Since independence Ukraine's political elite has failed to address the problem in an adequate manner. The recent escalation of the confl ict is due to a lack of political cohesion in the young state and the gravitational eff ect of the major powers rather than primarily to some kind of civilizational diff erence. By accentuating Ukraine's economic and fi nancial diffi culties, the global crisis has made the country even more vulnerable.
Introduction
In his much-cited work, the Clash of Civilizations Huntington classifi ed Ukraine as a "cleft country" (Huntington, S.P. 1993a) . Some may regard the events of the spring of 2014 as the fulfi lment of his "prediction". The main line of argument in Huntington's work concerns the fault lines between the major civilizations, which, in Huntington's view, are determined primarily by religion and culture. Adding to this idea, we note the following in connection with Ukraine: although, at the time of the last census in 2001, only 66.3% of Ukraine's inhabitants self-identifi ed as Ukrainian native speakers and 77.8% as ethnic Ukrainians (Bochkovs'ka, A. et al. 2008) , it is also true that 97.2% of the population spoke one of the East Slavic languages (www.ukrcensus.gov. ua) and three-quarters were Eastern Orthodox or Greek Catholic Christians (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002) . In other words, these people are part of the same (Slavic-Orthodox) major civilization. Ukraine's 3.2 million Greek Catholics constitute the largest religious minority (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002) ; they are concentrated in Galicia and in Transcarpathia (Zakarpatt ia). Meanwhile, the country's 8 million ethnic Russians do not form a majority apart from Crimea and several raions (districts). The main fault line, therefore, is not religious affi liation or ethnicity, but arises from an interaction of factors that we seek to identify in this study by exploring the historical, social and political processes and the spatial and geographical contexts of the present confl ict.
The current discord in Ukraine is rooted in the political divisions that have frequently characterised the post-communist countries and have been accentuated by the global economic crisis. Owing to divergent socio-economic development in the various regions of Ukraine, these divisions have deep historical roots and are strongly regional. This regional aspect is not seen in the other post-communist countries. This socio-economic divergence is basically historical in origin, but alongside ethnic and religious aspects we can also identify such infl uencing factors as urbanisation, economic development, and even natural elements.
In the more than two decades since independence, the political elite of the young independent state has failed, in general, to mitigate the regional diff erences and strengthen the unity of the country. Indeed, Ukraine's unity has been due almost exclusively to the interests of the major powers (The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, 1994) rather than to domestic socio-political cohesion. The absence of socio-economic reforms, policies promoting the Ukrainian language and centralised government rather than regionalisation, and tensions arising in the wake of the global economic crisis have strengthened separatism. In this process the actions of the major foreign powers have been a contributory factor. Ukraine has thus been incapable of responding eff ectively to the centrifugal forces created by the major powers (NATO/EU vs. Russia). At regular intervals and even amid the discord of 2014, a majority in Ukrainian society -in both the eastern and western parts of the country -have expressed the demand for an independent and united Ukraine. At present, however, Ukrainian identity means something very diff erent to people in the West Ukrainian L'viv (Galicia) and to their fellow citizens in the East Ukrainian Donets'k (Donbas) (Hryzak, J. 2002; Haran, A. 2002) .
The aim of this study is to present the Ukrainian dichotomy and then to explore, from a historical perspective, the processes that have led to the current impasse and their eff ect on the dichotomy, which relates to identity and to such societal factors as ethnicity, language, culture and urbanisation. We seek also to investigate the political dimensions of the dichotomy as refl ected in the election results and in the current politico-military confl ict. In the course of our analysis, we made reference to historical sources as well as to census and election statistics. Further, when examining the spatial aspects of the present confl ict, we performed a media analysis, based on which we compiled a regional database and thematic map of events in Ukraine between November 2013 and May 2014. When collecting the spatial-specifi c information, we explored not only the classical printed and electronic Ukrainian, Russian and international sources, but also the so-called social media, including place-related news stories shared on Facebook or on Twitt er (e.g. #euromaidan) and Tumblr. These latt er sources not only play an increasingly important role in mass media, but also, through their reporting, they themselves oft en become shapers of events, as we saw at the time of the so-called Arab Spring (DeLong-Bas, N.J. 2013) .
Following the publication of our atlas Ukraine in Maps , it is not our purpose in this article to off er a comprehensive account of the historical development of Ukraine, the ethnogenesis of the Ukrainian people, or the social, ethnic and economic processes underway in the country and its spatial divisions. Rather, we focus on the causes of the regional dichotomy and, within these confi nes, take into account only those factors that infl uence this dichotomy.
Ukraine as a state and the Ukrainians as a nation
Ukraine's regional diversity (the East-West dichotomy) has three interrelated causes:
(1) On the present territory of Ukraine, there was, in essence, no unifi ed and independent country in the longer term until the mid-20 th century. The UkrainianRussian boundary began to emerge in the early 1920s under the auspices of the Soviet Union, and the country's present territory was formed by 1954. Further, Ukraine won independence only in 1991 (Wilson, A. 2002; Yekelchyk, S. 2007) .
(2) Owing to the territorial fragmentation, the term Ukraine had a rather broad meaning until the early 20 th century. Ukraine was fi rst mentioned in 1187, in the so-called "Chronicle of Ipaty", but the territory to which the au-thor was referring is still disputed even today (Pivtorak, H.P. 2004 ). According to some commentators, the very name of the country -u-kraina -means borderland, periphery or frontier region. Other authors, however, have claimed that u-kraina means "in/inside the country, domestic land" (Sklyarenko, V. 1991; Pivtorak, H.P. 2004) .
(3) Refl ecting the fragmentation and the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the term Ukraine, identity also exhibits dichotomic features (Khmelko, V. and Wilson, A. 1998 ). According to a survey conducted in L'viv and in Donets'k in 2000, 78% of the population of L'viv self-identifi ed primarily as Ukrainians. Meanwhile, in Donets'k, 45% of respondents self-identifi ed as Soviet citizens, with only 23% self-identifying as Russians and 26% as Ukrainians (Hryzak, J. 2002) .
In the eastern half of the country -and especially among the ethnic Russian population -the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" are connected in people's minds with Russia's periphery. In contrast, the inhabitants of western Ukraine generally possess the strongest Ukrainian national identity (Haran, A. 2002) . In that area, Ukraine means a nation and a country that is distinct from Russia in terms of both identity and language. The origins of this independent national consciousness can be traced all the way back to the Kievan Rus. Meanwhile, the Russians are regarded as a people that developed subsequently, having diverged from the European path of development under Tatar rule. This sharp diff erentiation from the Russians is also a result of the diff erent path of historical development taken by Ukrainians aft er the disintegration of the still united East Slavic state, the Kievan Rus. It was this ethnogenesis that gave rise to the independent Ukrainian nation (Magocsi, P.R. 1996) .
Historical and geographical roots of regional diversity in Ukraine
Steppe and the forest zone, as the dichotomic arena of societal development
The natural landscape of Eastern Europe, including that of Ukraine, exhibits a fundamental duality. The forest steppe and forest region lies to the northwest of the Uman'-Kharkiv line, while to the south-east of this line we fi nd the steppe zone (Karácsonyi, D. 2006) (Figure 1) .
The forest zone is the ancient homeland of the early Slavs who were tillers of the land (Isaev, D.V. red. 2012a) . It was here that the East Slavic Empire of Kiev (Kyiv) arose, to be followed by Muscovy to the north-east. In contrast, the steppe zone to the south was the home of the nomads, sometimes forming part of a great empire stretching from Central Asia to the Carpathian Basin -the Hunnic Empire and the Golden Horde -and sometime becoming a "highway" for nomadic peoples. The great nomadic empires managed to extend their power to the Slavs living in the forest zone for shorter or longer intervals, but they could not retain control of the forests in the long term.
Until the 18 th century, the Slavs were similarly unable to control the steppe, as they were preoccupied with their domestic batt les -with the break up of the Kievan Rus and with Tatar domination -and then with the rivalry between Poland (Poland-Lithuania) and Russia. It was at this time that the diff erentiation of the Eastern Slavs began, whereby Ukrainian and Belarusian in the Polish-Lithuanian territories became separated from the Russian language and culture which dominated the areas ruled by Muscovy (the Russian Empire) from its growing base in Moscow (which was a Tatar vassal for some time). This cultural separation was accentuated by the Union of Brest (1596), at which the Orthodox Christians living under Polish rule recognised the authority of the Pope in Rome. During the Lithuanian and later Polish-Lithuanian supremacy (from the 14 th century) the Ukrainians were enriched by progressive western European ideas (Smolyi, V. 2008) . 
Ukrainians in a power triangle
By the 16 th century, the central area of present-day Ukraine had become a marginal zone in the struggle between the power triangle of Muscovy, the Polish Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth), and the Ott oman Empire with their Crimean Tatar vassals. The historical evolution of Ukrainians is fundamentally punctuated around this time (Smolyi, V. 2008) . On the margins of the steppe, in the "Wild Plains", there arose a free, semi-military peasant group. Having escaped serfdom, this group -the Cossacks -became a prerequisite and a means for the conquest of the steppe. With the west-east migration of this group, the Ukrainian ethnic territory reached the margins of the steppe in the east between the mid-16 th and mid-17 th centuries (Loza, Y. 2005a (Loza, Y. , 2005b (Figure 2 ). The balance of power between Muscovy, Poland and the Ott oman Empire gradually broke down in the course of the 17 th century. At that time, the Russian Empire, which had become increasingly powerful, started to push the Poles out of Eastern Europe. In this long process the most important development in relation to Ukraine was the decision of the Cossack state of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi to break away from the Poles and form an alliance with the Russian Tsar (1654, Pereiaslav Agreement) (Figure 3) .
Although some historians -e.g. Hrushevskyi, M. (1904) , the time-honoured Ukrainian historian -trace the emergence of the Ukrainians as far back as Halych, and even to the Kievan Rus, the Cossacks were the fi rst ethnic community that came to refl ect the characteristic features of the Ukrainians as an ethnically independent society. They were the only force who would spar with neighbouring states in the name of the Ukrainians, fi ghting for their right to an existence and economic and spiritual development. In the political fi eld, the Cossacks established a new era of Ukrainian nation-building (Smolyi, V. 2008) .
The Treaty of Andruszów / Andrusovo (1667), which sett led the fate of the Cossack territories for a good hundred years until the partition of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) , conserved the east-west division of Ukraine along the Dnieper. The right-bank of the Dnieper (Pravoberezhzhia-Ukraine) remained under Polish rule, while the left -bank (Livoberezhzhia-Ukraine), the Hetmanschyna (Hetmanate), came under Russian control. Following the fi nal partition of Poland (1795), Ukraine became the Russian Empire's western borderland. In 1772, the central parts of present-day Ukraine and then, in 1793, the entire country apart from Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia, which had become part of the Habsburg Empire, were integrated into the Russian Empire (Figure 4) .
Despite being integrated into the Austrian and Russian empires, the Ukrainians managed to signifi cantly develop their culture. The result of this was a phenomenon of cultural and national revival in the middle of the 19 th century that further stimulated the development of a national movement at the turn of the 19 th and 20 th centuries (Smolyi, V. 2008) . 
Russian colonisation in the steppe
During the reign of Catherine the Great, the Russian Empire "defeated" the steppe by the end of the 18 th century, put an end to the last autonomy of the Cossacks (1775: devastation of Zaporozhian Sich) and advanced as far as the Black Sea (1783: occupation of Crimea), thereby achieving a strategic aim of its expansion. In the newly unifi ed region, the way was open to the colonisation of a sparsely populated part of the steppe that had lain outside the control of the central (former Polish, later Russian) authority (Figure 2) . The region was organised into a governorate known as New Russia (Novorossiya) (Magocsi, P.R. 1996) . The Tsarist authorities invited hundred of thousands of sett lers to the newly conquered territory. Migration was not spontaneous, as it had been to a lesser or greater extent at the time of the Cossacks (Subtelny, O. 2000) . Until the beginning of the 19th century, successive waves of migrants -Germans, Serbs, Czechs, Bulgarians and Greeks -arrived in the region, but the Ukrainians and Russians were clearly the largest groups of sett lers.
The coastal region became an integral part of the Russian Empire much sooner than did the steppe, which turned into an internal periphery. The late 18 th century saw the foundation of Sevastopol, Odesa, Kherson and Mykolaiv on the Black Sea coast and of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov. These towns became bases for the expanding Russian navy and their role in commerce also grew. It was then that the fertile Chernozem soils of the Ukrainian steppe were ploughed to produce grain for export (Magocsi, P.R. 1996) , resulting in a booming trade in grain. This led to the rapid development of Odesa as the principal grain port in the steppe zone.
Due to colonisation and the founding of new cities, the southern regions of present-day Ukraine increasingly became, in the course of the 19 th century, a frontier region for Russians. The increase of population of the four governorates in the steppe zone (formerly "New Russia") surged aft er the conclusion of the Crimean War (1856) and the Russian emancipation of serfs (1861). There was a wave of migration from the inner central regions of the Russian Empire to the peripheral areas, including the governorates of New Russia (Magocsi, P.R. 1996) . Kyiv and the major cities already had a Russian majority during the census of 1897 (Chornyi, S. 2001 ). The population of the Black Sea Coastal Lowland (including Odesa and the other major seaports) increased nine-fold between 1810 and 1910, while the inner steppe zone (Kharkiv and Katerinoslav governorates) saw a fi ve-fold population increase (Karácsonyi, D. 2008) .
The process of industrialisation, which began on the territory of presentday Ukraine at the end of the 19 th century, added to the regional polarisation, as the territorial distribution of mineral resources in the country is unequal. The coal and salt of Donets Basin (Donbas) in the East, the iron ore of Kryvyi Rih and Kerch and the manganese ore of Nikopol were the raw materials on which a signifi cant industrial base could be built. By the end of the 19 th century, the increase of population of the coastal governorates began to decline, while the industrialising inner steppe regions moved ahead in terms of the rate of population increase (Karácsonyi, D. 2008) . In the eastern half of the steppe region, heavy industry underwent rapid growth. Since industrialisation had begun earlier in the Ural Mountains (Russia, 17 th century), Russians from that region were overrepresented among arrivals in Ukraine's industrial regions and they made up the skilled workforce (Subtelny, O. 2000) . Consequently, the share of the Russian population increased further in the early 20 th century. Ukraine began to emerge in its current form in the Soviet Union of the 1920s. In 1922, the country offi cially became a "founding" member of the Soviet Union and its precise borders with Russia and Belarus were set out. Concurrently, as a result of the relatively liberal Soviet ethnic and linguistic policy characteristic of the 1920s ("Korenisatsia"), Ukrainian culture and literacy began to undergo a Renaissance, and the authorities att empted to eradicate illiteracy in the entire population.
The shaping of Ukraine within the Soviet frame
In the Ukrainian countryside the NEP (New Economic Policy proposed by Lenin, 1921 Lenin, -1928 off ered a brief interval for social advancement, but the rural middle class that prospered as a result of this policy (and generally the total peasantry) was destroyed physically by Stalinist terror during the Holodomor (man-made famine, Hunger-extermination) . About 3-8 million people died due to an artifi cially engineered famine, particularly aff ecting the Ukrainian peasantry (Kulchitskyi, S. 2008; Franco, J.E. and Cieszynska, B. 2013) . The greatest population losses occurred in the central zone of the country, the Dnieper area, where Ukrainian peasant society, which had considerable political potential and was determined to resist enforced collectivisation, was almost completely liquidated (Kulchitskyi, S. 2008; Vallin, J. et al. 2009 ).
Whereas rural society was threatened by political and physical destruction, from 1928, with the commencement of the First Five-Year Plan, industry recovered ("second industrial revolution"). In consequence, there was unprecedented urban population growth in the 1930s in the eastern steppe areas. The major industrial centres -constituting social support bases for the Soviet Union -took on their present form during this period. The four centres in the process of industrialisation were Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih and Donets'k (Stalino). Between 1926 and 1939, the population of Kharkiv doubled to 840,000. This was due not only to industrialisation, but also to the fact that until 1934 the city was the capital of Soviet-Ukraine. On the eve of World War I, rural inhabitants had accounted for around four-fi ft hs of Ukraine's population. Between 1913 and 1939, the number of urban dwellers doubled, as millions of peasant farmers, fearing collectivisation and the man-made famine (Holodomor), fl ed to the growing Soviet industrial cities where they soon lost their rural roots.
The country experienced massive immigration of Russians in the frame of Soviet industrialisation. The Ukrainian-Russian ethnic changes were controlled by the migration fl ows and assimilation processes arising as a product of the ethnic policy in the Soviet Union. "Ukrainisation" in the early Soviet period (1921-32) had led to an increase in the ratio of Ukrainians from 72% to 74.8%. The following period was characterised by the persecution of Ukrainians and "Russifi cation" (Bochkovs'ka, A. et al. 2008) . The Russian minority's share of the population increased from just 8.1% in 1926 to 22% in 1989. Most of the increase was due to inward migration, and a smaller part to the Russifi cation of Ukrainians and to the ethnic homogenisation that occurred in the 20 th century (World War II, Holocaust, deportations), whose principal victims were Jews, Poles, Tatars and Germans ( Figure 5) .
From the 1950s until the 1980s, Russifi cation exerted a lesser or greater effect on ethnic relations (Eberhardt, P. 1994). The urban population ratio reached 50% in the mid-1960s. The 1960 and 1970s witnessed an annual increase of half a million in the population of the block of fl ats-cities ("Khrushchyovka-cities"), which lacked all forms of social cohesion. The urban population grew until the 1989 census, when it peaked at around 34.8 million. By the 1980s, apart from in western Ukraine, the most advanced cities tended to be Russian-speaking, while the more backward countryside continued to be Ukrainian-speaking. Such rural areas experienced a fall in population, caused by emigration and -from the 1970s onwards -by the low natural increase rate of an aging society.
The struggle among interest groups in the independent Ukraine
Aft er Ukraine left the Soviet Union, the centralised structures began to fall apart. In the early 1990s, the various regions sought to decouple themselves from the central government in Kyiv along the dividing lines in public administration. During this period, some were already arguing that the newly independent Ukraine needed to become a federal state like Germany (Haran, A. 2002) . Centralising traditions, however, rendered this impossible. The secessionist aspira- tions of Crimea culminated in a political confl ict with Russia. In the end, the peninsula received broad autonomy, becoming the only autonomous republic within Ukraine. Similar ambitions were a factor in the east (in the oblasts (regions) of Donets'k and Luhans'k), in southern Ukraine and also in Transcarpathia (Haran, A. 2002) . In 1991, the "Democratic Union of New Russia" set out its goal of reviving the former New Russia (Novorossiya) and achieving independence from Ukraine (Haran, A. 2002) . Donets'k, Odesa, L'viv and Simferopol became regional power centres alongside the central government.
In post-independence Ukraine, regional "clans" controlled by the socalled oligarchs became a peculiar element in the country's regional structure. The clans were in fact business interest groups (Haran, A. 2002; Åslund, A. 2005 ) that had established their economic and political infl uence in the course of the privatisation process. Their impact was felt on the politics of the various regions, and they dominated the economy. Such groups were "in charge" in the Donets Basin as well as in Dnipropetrovs'k and in Kyiv (Åslund, A. 2005) . The east-west division of Ukraine has become particularly acute since the country's Orange Revolution (2004) ( Table 1) .
East-West dichotomy today -an ethnic, lingusitic, religious, cultural, economic or political dichotomy?

Ethnic Ukrainians versus Ethnic Russians?
The titular nation of the country, the Ukrainians (37.5 million) constituted 77.8%, the Russians (8.3 million) 17.3% of the total population in 2001. Only in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea did their ratio remain below 50% (24.3%) (Figure 6 ). Aside from the Russians, Ukraine's other minorities add variety to the ethnic mix, but they do not infl uence the country's regional divisions (Molochko, V.V. 2003). The Russian-Ukrainian ethnic boundary cannot be precisely drawn, as there is no clear separation between the two groups (Khmelko, V. and Wilson, A. 1998; Wilson, A. 1998) . The Russian share of the population decreases steadily from the south-east to the north-west. Indeed, ethnic Russians live mainly in the industrialised eastern regions of the country (Haran, A. 2002) . Their ratio is especially high in Crimea, the only region of the country where Russians form an absolute majority (58.3%). Urban dwellers account for 86.8% of the Russian minority population. Russians are present in every Ukrainian city, but their share within the urban population ranges from 5-8% in Western Ukraine to 25-40% in Eastern Ukraine. More than half of the urban dwellers in Donets Basin and in Crimea are Russians. In rural areas, the Russian presence is limited almost completely to the steppe region, where the share of Russian population in certain raions (districts) makes up 20-30%. 
West-East
Despite the large population number, the share of Russian minority is not of such magnitude to explain the east-west dichotomy that characterises Ukraine. A further nuance, however, is that in view of their cultural proximity the Ukrainian and Russian ethnic groups have historically intermixed with one another. The Russian minority's share within Ukraine's population fell from 22% to 17% between 1989 and 2001, owing in part to assimilation and in part to people repatriating to Russia. As a result of the measures taken by the state (e.g. declaring Ukrainian to be the only offi cial state language), masses of Russians, people of mixed (Russian-Ukrainian) origin and Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the eastern and southern parts of the country (excluding Crimea) began to assume a Ukrainian identity (Bochkovs'ka, A. et al. 2008) .
Native Ukrainians versus Native Russians?
The relation of the native language to ethnic affi liation is an important indicator of ethnic-national development. The percentage of Russian speakers in Ukraine is signifi cantly higher than the Russian ethnic ratio. The percent- age diff erence stems from the fact that 14.8% of ethnic Ukrainians (22% of urban dwellers and 3% of rural inhabitants) identifi ed Russian as their native language (mother tongue) in the 2001 census. In the eastern regions and in Crimea, the percentage was much higher: 50-60% of ethnic Ukrainians in the Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasts and in Crimea identifi ed Russian as their mother tongue (Figure 7) .
Although Ukrainian is the offi cial state language in Ukraine (Constitution… 1996 , Law… 1989 , the share of Ukrainian native speakers increased by only 2.8% between 1989 and 2001 (whereas the Ukrainian ethnic ratio increased by 5.1% in the same time interval).
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Russian was indicated as the mother tongue by 29.6% (14.3 million) of the population. Only 67.5% of the country's inhabitants declared Ukrainian 5 The status of Ukrainian as the national state language was confi rmed by the Language Law of 2012, a piece of legislation that was much criticised by Ukrainian nationalists. The pretext for the scandal was the "regional language status" granted by the Language Law to the languages of the national minorities, as well as some associated rights. An exaggerated concern for the future of the Ukrainian language led some people to interpret the measures as statutory backing for Russifi cation eff orts. as their native language in 2001. Native Russian speakers account for half of the population to the East of the Uman'-Kharkiv line and as much as threequarters of the population of the Donets Basin, the coastal region of the Sea of Azov, and Crimea. The dominance of Russians in the eastern oblasts (regions) is concentrated almost exclusively in the major cities, which diff er significantly in demographic terms from the surrounding, dominantly Ukrainian speaking, sparsely populated, rural areas. In the eastern regions, therefore, we fi nd Russian-speaking cities surrounded by Ukrainian-speaking rural areas, whereas in the western half of the country Russian is spoken as a native language mostly by the Russian minority in the major cities (Figure 8) .
Ukrainian is used less frequently in the southern and eastern regions among Ukrainian native speakers. Following 1991, large amounts of the Russian-speaking population of mixed ethnic origin declared Ukrainian as a mother tongue, even though remaining practically Russophone (Bochkovs'ka, A. et al. 2008) . In the regions dominated by Russophones (Crimea, Donets'k and Luhans'k oblasts) a continuing decrease in the ratio of Ukrainian native speakers could be observed.
The linguistic picture is rendered more complex by the use of various mixtures of Russian and Ukrainian -the Surzhyk sociolects -in everyday life (Bernsand, N. 2001; Bilaniuk, L. 1997) . Surzhyk has low prestige; its speakers tend to be poorly educated with insecure identities (Bilaniuk, L. 2004; Csernicskó, I. 2011a Csernicskó, I. , 2011b Csernicskó, I. , 2013 Fodor, Gy. and Csernicskó, I. 2013) . It is the primary language of 10-15% of Ukraine's population (Khmelko, V.Y. 2004) , with the highest ratio of speakers in the central-eastern part of the country.
Kyiv versus Moscow Patriarchate?
Depending on geographical location, historical development, and the sociodemographic structure of the population, there are striking diff erences in the religiosity between the western and eastern regions of the country (similar to the ethnic features and political att itudes of the local population). The share of those who identifi ed themselves as believers is 86.6% in the West, whilst this fi gure is only 50.5% in the East (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002) .
The higher degree of religiosity (and lower degree of secularisation) in the western territories incorporated into Soviet-Ukraine between 1939 and 1945 can be att ributed to the shorter period of aggressive and atheistic Soviet authority over these territories (ca. 45 years vs. 70 years in the East), and it also refl ects the massive presence of the centralised and particularly active Catholic churches in the West. This religious-geographic diff erence (together with the ethnic, cultural and political factors) is one of the major determinants of the future of Ukraine (Figure 9) . The overwhelming majority (68.8%) of Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians. In 2002, out of the Orthodox population polled, 53.2% declared itself "simply Orthodox", 23.8% as affi liated with the Kyiv Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 14.8% with the Moscow Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and 2.4% with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Bychenko, A. and Dudar, N. 2002) . Before 1990 all Ukrainian Orthodox communities were united in the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. Its legal successor, the Moscow Patriarchate, which remained linked with the Russian Orthodox Church, has the allegiance of two-thirds of the Orthodox communities and controls the overwhelming majority of the Orthodox religious infrastructure. The "heartland" of the pro-Russian Moscow Patriarchate is the eastern and southern, mostly Russophone part of the country.
The most important hinterlands of the Ukrainophone Kyiv Patriarchate are the western (fi rst of all, Volhynian) territories with their dominant ethnic Ukrainian character. The majority of the adherents to the relatively weak Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church live in the areas mentioned above (mainly in Galicia). The Greek Catholic churches were also closely related to the Ukrainian national and independence movements. Following their rehabilitation they remained as regional churches with their main hinterlands in Galicia and Transcarpathia.
Urban versus Rural Ukraine?
The line Uman'-Kharkiv is not only a divide between steppe and forest, eastern and western Ukraine, but also between urban and rural Ukraine (Kará-csonyi, D. 2009). The rural population distribution is uneven: 65% of rural inhabitants live in the western part of the country, where the share of rural population is 44%. An even more nuanced picture emerges if we exclude Kyiv's 2.8 million inhabitants. In this case, urban dwellers account for only a half of Western Ukraine's population. In contrast, urban dwellers account for 78% of the population in the eastern part of the country. In regions comprising the major industrial centres, for instance, in the Donets Basin, the inhabitants live almost exclusively in urban areas (Figure 10) .
In the East, the development of the sett lement network has only impacted the higher levels of the sett lement hierarchy, in particular those cities founded in the 18 th and 19 th centuries by Russian sett lers on the sparsely populated steppe. In contrast, in western Ukraine -mainly in Galicia -the sett lement hierarchy is much more balanced, because in this area the dense network of small towns and villages was formed over the course of centuries as part of an integral development (Dnistrianska, N.I. and Dnistrianskyi, M.S. 2013). 
Industrial East versus Agrarian West?
The western part of Ukraine is a region dominated by agriculture and forestry, whereas the eastern part is well known for its industrial specialisation and is characterised by mining and heavy industries. Western Ukraine was not greatly aff ected by industrialisation, because there was a lack of mineral resources that would have been needed to achieve signifi cant industrialisation. Moreover, the industrialisation of the region and the development of its infrastructure was neglected for strategic reasons -the proximity of the western border. Here, traditional Ukrainian rural society could survive until the most recent times (Skryzhevska, Y. and Karácsonyi, D. 2012) . During the economic crisis of the 1990s, the eastern part of Ukraine experienced the most dramatic decline in population and quality of life compared to other regions. The transformation was survived more easily by the industrial area near the Dnieper and the environs of Donets'k City. The industry of the cities upon the Dnieper is high-tech (missile and aerospace technology - Mrinska, O. 2004 ). There are multiple links with the Russian defence industry within the framework of technological cooperation among production plants. Donets'k has become the economic-fi nancial and political-administrative centre of the region. Most Russian investment has come to this city. Ukraine's most developed regions lie in the eastern part of the country, and this is linked with urbanisation. It is the reverse of what we see in other parts of Eastern Europe, where the level of economic development generally decreases from West to East.
Yanukovich versus Maidan?
Ukraine's population is regionally divided not only in terms of ethnic ties, religious affi liation, the urbanisation rate, and economic development. The regional factor is also a strong determinant of political activity and party affi liation (Kubicek, P. 2000) . In the 1990s, Ukraine moved inexorably towards the political division that has been a feature ever since the presidential elections of 2004. In fact, this division could be observed as early as the 1994 presidential elections (Kravchuk and Kuchma) (Tihomirov, D.I. 2013 ). In the elections of December 2004, the western part of the country supported Yushchenko, the presidential candidate seeking an alliance with the West. In Galicia more than 90% of voters gave their support to the "Orange Revolution", while in the west-central region the corresponding fi gure was 70%. Meanwhile, in southern and eastern Ukraine -excluding Crimea and Donets Basin -60% of voters supported the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovich. In Crimea and in the oblasts (regions) of Donets'k and Luhans'k, the pro-Russian side received 90% of the votes (Åslund, A. 2005) .
Indications of Ukraine's social, political, and geographic divisions were also apparent in the results of the 2010 presidential elections and of the 2012 parliamentary elections. The spatial distribution of votes cast for the two candidates in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections (Yulia Tymoshenko -45.5% and Viktor Yanukovich -49.0%) shows a clear decrease in support for Tymoshenko from northwest to southeast, and a clear increase for Yanukovich (Figure 11 and 12) .
The percentage of votes cast for Yanukovich correlates -at the level of the regions (oblasts) -more closely with the share of Russian native speakers (according to the 2001 census) than with the percentage of persons of Russian ethnic affi liation (the correlation coeffi cient of the former is 0.896, while that of the latt er is 0.812). An even closer correlation (r = 0.927) could be observed, however, between support for Yanukovich at the regional (oblast) level and the share of urban dwellers with Russian native language. This latt er trend underlines the signifi cant role of cities -among other factors -in shaping political opinion.
At the level of the raions (districts), the correlation between native language and the election results was less striking: for instance, the correlation coeffi cient between Yanukovich voters and the Russian native speakers was just 0.715. A far stronger correlation was observed for cities of oblast (regional) signifi cance (r = 0.871) than for predominately rural raions (districts) (r = 0.655). In the raions of Transcarpathia, Chernivtsi oblast (North Bukovina) and Odesa oblast (South Bessarabia), inhabited also by non-Russian minorities (Hungarians, Romanians, and Bulgarians etc), a higher proportion of votes were cast for Yanukovich, the candidate with a more permissive stance on the language issue.
Evidently, the close correlation merely indicates that native language was a factor infl uencing the election results; it does not show that people voted on narrow ethnic lines. In the knowledge of the census data on native language, we can see that Yanukovich needed the votes of many non-Russianspeaking Ukrainians in order to win the election. This was especially so in the mostly Ukrainian-speaking rural raions of the south-east administered by Russian-speaking oblast centres. In the southeastern (steppe) areas of Ukraine, there are historical traditions of Russian social dominance. In the Tsarist era, the majority of local nobility was Russian native speaker, as were the Orthodox priests in these areas. In the Soviet era, the same Russian dominance characterised the Bolshevik and Communist Party elites.
The country's northwest-southeast division could also be observed at the time of the 2012 parliamentary elections in the regional distribution of votes cast for parties committ ed to the Ukrainian national ideal and for parties with a Russian or ex-Soviet orientation (Tihomirov, D.I. 2013) . The geopolitical division highlighted by the election results has been a constant underlying factor in Ukraine's domestic political crisis of 2013-14. 
Geography and space in the current confl ict
The East-West division, which has been evident in all Ukraine's parliamentary and presidential elections since 2004, led to armed confl ict in 2014. In November 2013, protests began in Kyiv (Euromaidan) in response to the Ukrainian leadership's decision -taken under Russian political and economic pressure -to withdraw from an association agreement with the EU just one week before its planned signature.
For some time the confl ict was concentrated in a narrow area, the Maidan (Maidan Nezalezhnosti -Independence Square), a central square in the Ukrainian capital. Maidan became, aft er the Orange Revolution of 2004, a symbolic place of Ukrainian protest culture; the demonstrators prepared for a long and peaceful struggle for their goals. From the end of November 2013, the authorities tried on successive occasions to end the initially peaceful protest with its limited demands. These actions led ultimately to overt armed violence. In late February 2014, President Yanukovich left the country, and on 21 February an interim political coalition took control of Ukraine.
A survey 6 conducted by the Fund "Democratic Initiatives of Ilka Kucheriv" together with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology gauged the social composition of the Maidan protestors. The proportion of people not affi liated to any political party was 92%, while 61% of the protestors had been spurred to action by violence on the part of the authorities. The fi ndings showed a strikingly high proportion of non-Kyiv residents (88%) among the protestors in the capital city. The regional distribution of arrivals from other regions reveals both the country's division in terms of political activity (West Ukraine 55% and Central Ukraine 24%) and the fact that all parts of the country were represented at the epicentre of the confl ict (East Ukraine 21%). The linguistic data support this impression: 59% of the demonstrators at Maidan were Ukrainian-speaking, while 24% were bilingual.
In January the confl ict began to spread to western Ukraine (Lviv) and central parts of the country (Automaidan). In a symbolic break from the Soviet past, dozens of Lenin statues were toppled (the so-called Leninopad) in the second half of February. The toppling of statues took place mainly in central parts of the country, because in West Ukraine the statues had been removed back in the early 1990s, while in East Ukraine local counter-demonstrations (e.g. in Kharkiv) now prevented their removal -apart from some smaller towns (Figure 13) .
Aft er Yanukovich's fl ight, the direction of the confl ict changed (Figure 14) . In late February, the "epicentre" of the confl ict switched to the dominantly Russian-inhabited Autonomous Republic of Crimea and City of Sevastopol, a part of Ukraine only since 1954. Concurrently, a counter protest group launched intense protests in the south-eastern half of the country (Anti-Maidan). In March, events in Crimea transformed a domestic confl ict into an international one.
Following a Russian-supervised referendum on 16 March and Russia's subsequent annexation of Crimea, the confrontation turned into armed confl ict in April and continued in the south-eastern part of Ukraine, in the Donets Basin. Odesa was also the scene of deadly clashes. In April, based on the Crimean model, people's republics were declared in Donets'k, Luhans'k, Kharkiv and Odesa. On 11 May, the two former regions (oblasts) held "independence referendums", which were followed by what the Kyiv authorities termed "anti-terrorist" actions. These self-proclaimed state formations have not been recognised by any other states, including Russia. Questions surround the extent and popular acceptance of their power.
The traditional west-east "gradient" is evident once again in the voter turnout fi gures for the Ukrainian presidential election, held on 25 May 2014, and in the percentage of voters supporting Petro Poroshenko, the candidate who won the election (Fig. 15, 16 and 17) . The low turnout in the southeast refl ects primarily the decision of former Yanukovich supporters to stay away. The eff ect is magnifi ed in the Donets Basin, where separatists prevented, in some places, the proper functioning of the various election committ ees and the vote took place in a general atmosphere of intimidation. The armed confl ict in Ukraine has deepened to an unprecedented extent the discord between the eastern and western halves of the country, but the fact that Poroshenko won in all of Ukraine's regions -albeit by a diff erent margin of votes -indicates a possible reduction in the divide. Perhaps this development may be viewed as the emergence of an east-west consensus on the desirability of a peaceful solution.
Conclusions
Ukraine's east-west divide does not stem from a confl ict between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians or between Orthodox and Western Christianity. Rather, the country's divisions exhibit a multilevel regional structure formed in the course of a long historical development and refl ecting the nation-forming att itudes of Ukrainians. It is important to distinguish between the separatist ambitions of the Russian minority (e.g. Sevastopol, the towns of Donets Basin) and the dichotomy of Ukrainian identity, coupled with the associated confl ict. Eastern Ukrainians believe that they diff er both from western Ukrainians and from Russians: they view the West with suspicion and look to the Russians as partners. Even so, they do not want to accede to Russia at any cost. Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any desire for such a move. The escalation of the confl ict is due to the lack of domestic political cohesion (refl ecting Ukraine's youth) and to the gravitational eff ect of the major powers rather than primarily to some kind of civilizational diff erence.
Several authors have sought to criticise Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington, S.P. 1993a ) based on a quantitative analysis of events in the recent past (Russet, B.M. et al. 2000; Henderson, E.A. and Tucker, R. 2001 ). Huntington had argued that the complexity of the post-Cold War world order could best be described in terms of the fault lines between civilizations (Huntington, S.P. 1993b), but the critics showed mathematically that the number of inter-civilizational confl icts had actually decreased since the Cold War (Gurr, T.R. 1994) .
We now see that most of the confl icts in Europe in the early 1990s (the confl icts in Yugoslavia, Karabakh, Abkhazia) were rooted in ethnic tensions that had remained unresolved in the Cold War. These confl icts did not presage some kind of global struggle between civilizations. Seen from this angle, the confl ict over Crimea was the belated confl agration of a trouble spot. We may apply Henderson's argument (Henderson, E.A. 1997 ) -which is diametrically opposed Huntington's -to Ukraine: ethnic and linguistic similarities (!) also increase the potential for strife between countries. In his opinion (Henderson, E.A. 1998) , the form of government (democracy vs. dictatorship) and the distance between or proximity of states are far stronger explanatory factors in international confl icts than religious or ethnic diff erences. Both fi ndings are borne out by the Ukrainian-Russian confl ict.
Ukraine will not split of its own accord, but the extent to which it becomes a batt leground for the major powers in the short term will depend on whether the current confl ict deepens and whether the long-term damage can be reversed. It is crucial for Ukraine to strengthen domestic political cohesion and to create an eff ective and functional state. In place of forced centralisation, the means for this may be a policy of regionalisation that respects regional diff erences. A historical opportunity for such a policy could arise aft er the presidential election in May.
